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On the Theory of Finance 
for Privately Held Firms
James S. Ang
This paper is a first attempt at differentiating the problems of finance of the 
privately held small businesses from their larger counterparts. Small businesses, 
though not concerned with the problems and opportunities associated with 
publicly traded firms, have different types of complexities, such as shorter 
expected life, presence of estate tax, intergenerational transfer problems, and 
prevalence of implicit contracts. Some standard problems like agency and 
asymmetric information are also more complex. The relatively high transaction 
costs faced by small businesses in all types of financial decisions also preclude 
a sizable subset of available choices.
I. INTRODUCTION
Think small.
We, as financial researchers when confronted with potential research 
topics, have a fixation with resorting to the securities market for answers. 
Although it is a convenient and sometimes powerful approach, relying on 
the securities market will not get us very far in understanding small business 
finance. The requirement of analyzing only publicly traded firms whose 
share price data are continuously reported in easy to access sources virtually 
eliminate most truly small firms. To remedy this oversight I suggest that 
the simplest definition of a small firm is that it is privately held.* Even under 
this restrictive definition, there are millions of firms that may be considered 
as small businesses, from “mom and pop” operations to high technology 
firms on the verge of a public offering. I can assure you that at this point 
there is no single theory of finance that can adequately explain the behaviors 
of various types of small firms.
Even though I cannot promise you a unifying theory of small business 
finance, I will do the second or third best thing. I will attempt to give a sketch 
of what a finance theory for small business ought to be like, i.e., what are 
its unique determinants? How does it differ from the more familiar financial 
theory, which is modeled after large traded firms. Since small business
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finance research is a relatively new field, it would be more fruitful to speculate 
from the broadest set of factors and scenarios than working with a more 
formalized model with very narrow restrictions.
The paper is organized as follows. First, I discuss the features peculiar 
to privately held small businesses (Section II). These features, when in 
combination with standard financial issues such as agency, information, 
transaction costs, and taxes help determine how small businesses make 
financial decisions. The determinants of important financial decisions like 
capital structure, investments, dividends and liquidity management are then 
analyzed (Section III). Because the relative importance of different factors 
varies among types of small business. Section IV applies the broad financial 
model sketched in the previous sections to specific examples of small business 
types. Section V concludes the paper.
II. THE PRIVATELY HELD SMALL FIRMS
There are small businesses and there are small businesses. A complete 
taxonomy of privately held small businesses would classify a business based 
on whether it is a new or established business, how it is organized 
(proprietorship, partnership, corporation, cooperatives), who controls the 
voting and decision rights (family members versus outsiders), is it a high 
or low growth firm, and so on. Obviously, there is no such thing as a typical 
small business. Nevertheless, most small businesses do share some common 
features that are not as prominent in larger traded firms. These are as follows.
Integrating Personal and Business Accounts
Owners/managers in small businesses often have to make business and 
financial decisions on how they would ultimately affect their own personal 
wealth. For instance, optimal tax planning may suggest the type of 
organizational form as well as where and when gains or losses are to be 
realized and the type and mix of managerial compensations at both the 
business and personal levels. Due to unlimited liabilities (proprietorship and 
partnership) and incomplete limited liabilities (in the corporation form 
where lenders require personal guarantee or assets as collateral), business risk 
is no longer separable from personal risk. Business bankruptcy could cause 
personal bankruptcy.^ The amount of the owner’s nonbusiness personal 
assets matters. In case of multiple owners, the severity of agency problems 
and the potential shift in control are also a function of the relative as well 
as the absolute wealth of the various owners.
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Shorter Expected Life
Compared to large publicly traded firms, small businesses may cease 
operations for many more reasons. Small businesses can terminate due to 
the departure or demise of a single individual or the dissolution of a 
partnership. These problems are further exacerbated by the lack of 
management depth, absence of a succession plan, and noisy control contest. 
Thus, there needs to be a greater emphasis on the termination phase in 
modelling small businesses.
Estate Tax
Heirs to small businesses have to pay estate tax. Although astute tax 
planning, e.g., early transfer of ownership, and use of ESOP, could minimize 
the tax bite. Nevertheless, estate tax stands out as a significant item for small 
businesses, on a par with corporate and personal taxes. ^  The incidence of 
estate tax will not only reduce the value of the business, it may also cause 
a liquidation of the firm to satisfy tax obligations.
Both estate tax and shorter life span in small businesses tend to increase 
the number of involuntary liquidation states. This fact will not pass 
unnoticed by other groups of stakeholders—lenders, suppliers, customers, 
and employees.
Divergence Between Market and Personal Interest Rates
At least in theory, publicly traded firms are guided by market determined 
interest rates or required rates of return. Although small businesses can 
observe the market rates for comparable firms, and on occasion, have to pay 
market rates for financing, they may not use the market rates for making 
financial decisions. For instance, an entrepreneur is more likely to take risk 
than heirs who are more interested in preserving wealth. Thus when faced 
with the same risky prospect, these two groups of owners may not make the 
same decision to invest. Other reasons not to rely on the market rate may 
include over-optimistic perception of opportunities, lack of external 
funding, and limited outside alternatives to invest excess funds.
The Importance of Informal Relationships
If a large firm is a nexus of contracts among its various stakeholders, 
then the small business is a nexus of informal relationships among its 
stakeholders. Owners of small businesses depend on the F-connections 
(family and friends) for the first source of outside financing. In comparison
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to borrowing from strangers, traditional bonds, customs, loyalty, and 
repeated interpersonal transactions from these familiar sources all contribute 
to a reduction in agency costs. Small business owners and their stakeholders 
(local bankers, suppliers, customers and employees) also have more intimate 
knowledge of each other. This knowledge, which transcends formal financial 
reports, allows greater flexibility in adjusting the terms of the informal 
relationships.
Reputation capital has great value. It pays for both parties to sacrifice 
short term gains or to forego opportunistic behavior. A strong reputation 
enables a small business owner to acquire short term credit from suppliers 
and longer term financing from banks, or to secure favorable contracts from 
suppliers and customers. My conjecture is that the value of reputation to 
the small business owner is greater when (1) the owner has limited 
geographical mobility, or specialized nontransferable business skill; (2) there 
is high frequency of repeated transactions, where the dollar value per 
transaction tends to be small or moderate; (3) the flow of information among 
the stakeholders is efficient, e.g., a grapevine in a small community; and (4) 
there is a strong desire to pass on the business to heirs. Items (1) and (2) insure 
that gain in a single incident of breach of trust is small and not worthwhile. 
Item (3) precludes the low reputation type from obtaining alternate sources 
of funds and item (4) lengthens the relevant horizon of the firm and thus 
increases the present value of reputation.
Intergenerational Issue
A topic unique to a family-owned business is the intergenerational 
transfer issue. It refers not only to astute tax planning and ownership transfer, 
but also to the transfer of goodwill and reputation from one generation of 
owner to the next. Grooming an heir apparent in training usually preserves 
and transfers a larger percentage of the intangibles, while lack of an orderly 
succession plan may lead to the destruction of these intangibles, and a 
corresponding reduction in the value of the firm. To some extent, retaining 
the existing management of an acquired privately held small firm allows 
some of the firm’s intangibles to be transferred.
The Role of Two-Party Transactions
Small business owners deal with their stakeholders on a one to one basis, 
or two-party transactions. The owner’s financial strength, gaming, 
negotiating and bargaining skills could determine the outcomes of the 
observed financial decisions. The optimal relationships with the stakeholders 
may vary from cooperation to confrontation. As an extreme example of
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cooperation, a small business, when dealing with a stakeholder that values 
its own reputation capital highly, could voluntarily bond itself via policies 
that reduce its bargaining alternatives, for example, reduce the number of 
suppliers it deals with to increase its dependence on them. Elements of 
gaming may be involved when a cash rich small business under-reports its 
profitability to reduce the threat of wage increases. On the other hand, 
window dressing and favoring short term quick results may also be observed 
to strengthen one’s bargaining position. In sum, because small businesses 
deal with fewer opposite parties vis-a-vis the large publicly traded firms, 
concerns for gaming and negotiations could play a large role in explaining 
their behavior, some of which may appear to be counterintuitive at first 
glance.
Larger Potential for Making Mistakes
Most new small business owners have neither business experience nor 
training. In fact, most business ideas are pretty mundane; they are neither 
new nor profitable. Even for established firms, many are not equipped to 
changes in the business environment. Thus, there is a difference between 
what they ought to do, what they are capable of doing, what they want to 
do, and what they actually end up doing. Small businesses magnify a 
dilemma in financial research: mostly normative theoretical models are being 
used to explain positive empirical observations. To describe observed 
practices among small businesses, a researcher has to be willing to accept 
that small businesses are prone to make mistakes, either due to 
overconfidence or simply ignorance. For example, an observation of high 
debt in a firm may not indicate high debt capacity, which is what the theory 
will say, but rather, it could represent a deteriorating financial condition 
where a shrinking equity is combined with a debt level that could not be 
payoff.
Before I leave this section on modelling the peculicirities of small 
businesses, I would like to mention that standard issues in finance such as 
agency, information, failure costs, taxes, and transaction costs are no less 
important for small businesses. Take agency problems among equityholders. 
It ranges from none in the case of a proprietorship to potentially very serious 
in a partnership organization without limited liability. Costs of bonding and 
monitoring vary among different types of small businesses as well. Some 
lenders have intimate personal knowledge of the small businesses, and others 
have to depend on more costly on-site auditing. The seriousness of 
asymmetric information varies quite a bit too. It ranges from the very low, 
such as among those small businesses whose fortune depends largely on the 
local economic conditions in which the local banks would have superior
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knowledge, to very high information asymmetry, such as in the case of a 
research-oriented high tech startup where the owners are among the few 
experts in their narrow field.
It has also been documented that small businesses face higher failure 
costs, due to the presence of scale economics in bankruptcy expenses, etc. 
They also face higher transaction costs, for example, in complying with 
regulations or acquiring or transmitting information. Finally, step jumps 
in the progressive tax schedules for both business and personal incomes could 
also cause financial decisions around the jumps to be noncontinuous too.
III. FINANCIAL DECISIONS
In this section, I attempt to give my educated speculations to the following 
question: What are the determinants to the key financial decisions of small 
businesses? The purpose of this paper is to initiate the process of thinking 
about the finance problems of the privately held firms, hoping that more 
rigorous theorizing and empirical testing may follow.^ To give a semblance 
of theoretical modelling, I start out thinking about the objective function 
of privately held small businesses. Will it be similar to those of the large 
publicly traded firms where their objective function may be stated as 
consisting of maximizing three components: (a) current market price, to 
avoid unwanted mergers and to obtain outside financing in the securities 
market; (b) long term or intrinsic value, if the two values shall diverge; and 
(c) nonowner manager’s own pecuniary and nonpecuniary incomes from 
having control rights. Should the absence of marketable securities mean that 
small firms need not be concerned with current performance and can 
concentrate on long term value?
My thought on this subject is that, depending on the organizational 
types and circumstances, there are several admissible forms of objective 
function for small businesses. The simplest is the profitable small businesses 
where outside funding is not a major concern. These firms can afford to 
simply maximize long term value. On the other hand, most small businesses 
do need outside financing (e.g., banks and suppliers), and are being 
monitored in some fashion (e.g., Dun and Bradstreet). Current performance, 
albeit a rather noisy measure, may no longer be unimportant. Thus, a good 
number of small businesses would have a weighted average objective function 
consisting of both current profit and long term value. Weight for current 
profit is expected to be higher for small businesses approaching loan 
renegotiation, initial public offering, potential sale to an acquirer, signing 
long term contracts with supplier or customers and possible dissolution of 
a partnership. On the other hand, its weight will be smaller when the business
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is due to pay estate teixes, renegotiate employee contract, discourage a 
nonmanaging family member from selling their shares, and avoid tax on excess 
accumulation.^ Furthermore, since many owners of small firms integrate both 
business and personal accounts in terms of taxes, compensations, risk exposure 
and diversification, the complete formulation of the small businesses objective 
could be quite involved—incorporating schedules of personal and business 
taxes, forms of compensation and overall portfolio risk. A third, albeit behavior, 
goal is the “career independence” or the urge to aeate or build on the part of 
many entrepreneurs. With these concerns in mind, I discuss how small 
businesses would mjike the following financial decisions.
The Investment Decision
Two questions of theoretical interests are: (1) Would privately held small 
businesses invest too much or too little? In other words, are the marginal 
projects undertaken by the small businesses more likely to have negative or 
positive net present value? (2) If they invest, will they favor projects with 
quick short term or more steady long term cash flows?’
The question of over or underinvestment has received more attention 
in recent literature,* where the results are mostly driven by the conflict of 
interests between the shareholders and the lenders. Although agency conflict 
of this type could also arise in privately held small firms, over or 
underinvestment may occur for other reasons as well. To facilitate the 
presentation I have come up with two listings of factors, one offers the reasons 
for underinvestment and the other the reasons for overinvestment.
Reasons for Overinvestment
•  to avoid taxes on excess accumulation of profit. It may still be rational 
to accept negative NPV project if the small business could save enough 
taxes from undistributed profits.
•  an entrenched managing partner. An entrenched managing partner 
invests internal funds to avoid distribution to nonmanaging partners 
especially when he/she realizes the control benefit which may be a 
function of the firm’s size.
•  overconfidence and miscalculations. Small businesses often lack the 
complete set of requisite skills (such as production technology or 
marketing channels) to realize the full NPV of a not-so-simple project. 
Unfortunately, they often underestimate potential difficulties and 
overestimate their ability to tackle these problems, i.e., they assume that 
they are in the shoes of a much larger firm with more experience, depth 
and breadth in various skills.
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•  low cost of funds. Some business owners manage to obtain funds from 
family members and friends at below market, if not subsidized, interest 
rates (at equilibrium, implicit interest costs based on a long term 
relationship should be just as high as premiums on market rates). This 
artificially low interest rate could distort the investment decision to 
invest too much.
Reasons for Underinvestment
•  no or partial limited liability. Small business owners could face 
personal bankruptcy in the case of proprietorship or general 
partnership, and in the corporate form when personal assets are 
pledged to secure loans. Depending on the size of personal worth, its 
CO variability with the project, and the owner’s willingness to take risk, 
a small business owner may underinvest in low to moderately risky 
projects, but overinvest in very risky projects. This is because for low 
to moderately risky projects, personal worth is at risk. Since small 
businesses are often a one project firm, the risk of lack of diversification 
could be substantial. But for the very risky and very profitable project, 
potential loss far exceeds personal worth, and a valuable limited 
liability is again restored regardless of its organizational form.
•  attempting to solve agency problems in partnership. The partnership 
form has probably the most serious agency problems. Just imagine the 
harm a managing partner can impose on the unlimited liability silent 
partners via reckless risky investments. Thus, to protect their personal 
wealth from the managing partner, the nonmanaging partners would 
put restrictions on the former’s ability to invest. The restrictions may 
screen out bad projects as well as good projects, i.e., some positive NPV 
projects may not be undertaken.
•  high cost of external funds. Small businesses face a large discrete jump 
in the cost of funds when moving from the first sources of own savings 
and borrowing from family members and friends, to venture capital 
and out of town financial institutions. The presence of high 
transaction costs, asymmetric information between the owners and the 
outside capital suppliers, such as in the case of a new technologically 
sophisticated product, could cause a large wedge between the cost of 
funds perceived by the owners and by the capital suppliers.
•  unwilling to dilute control. Small business owners do derive pecuniary 
as well as nonpecuniary benefits from m aintaining control. 
Furthermore, there is also the desire to be able to pass on the business 
to their heirs. Thus, when faced with highly profitable but very large 
investment projects requiring outside financing that could result in
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the dilution of their control, some owners may forego the projects. And 
if the idea for a project cannot be sold, licensed, or subcontracted, then 
it is lost.
•  lack of resources. A problem of being small is that these businesses do 
not have the full range of managerial expertise for more involved 
projects, the breadth to diversify into unfamiliar areas, or simply the 
management depth to take on a large scale expansion. Thus, there is 
a gap in the NPV for the same project calculated for a vk^ell-staffed large 
firm and a small firm v^ i^th an incomplete management team. Some 
positive NPV projects for the large firm will appear to be negative for 
smaller firms and they will not be undertaken.^
The second issue of interest concerning the investment behavior of small 
businesses has to do with the question of whether they will favor short term 
but high payback (myopic) or high NPV but longer term projects. The 
answer depends on the objective function of the small businesses as discussed 
earlier, the need for outside financing, and imperfections in the financing 
market. On one hand, a cash rich small business can afford to invest in a 
long term value maximizing project. On the other hand, new firms that need 
to create an impression of being profitable, firms on the verge of initial public 
offering or debt renegotiations, firms that need cash to fund future more 
profitable projects where available financing may be uncertain, would all 
favor projects that give quick short term returns.
The Financing Decision
Small businesses use different sources for financing. In addition to the 
owner’s own savings and, family and friends, they also obtain financing from 
suppliers and advances from customers. Leverage ratio calculated from 
traditional financial reports is biased for several reasons. First, the role of 
quasi-equity is not recognized. Quasi-equity are debts held by individuals 
or institutions that have an implicit understanding with the small business 
owners (1) not to exercise the right to force bankruptcy when interest 
payments are delinquent, and (2) to share some residual claims when the 
firm is returned to profitability. Thus, equity (liabilities) is understated 
(overstated). Second, owners’ true equity contributions due to subsidized or 
reduced salary, low cost or free labor from family members, owners’ loan 
to the business, owners’ assets (used by the business or for loan guarantee 
but not recorded in the business financial statement), and owner’s intellectual 
property, are also underestimated. This effect is probably more important 
for firms in the early stages of their life cycle. Third, some asset and liability 
items are often not reported. The most important item in this category are
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leased assets. In addition to the lessor’s economies in purchasing and 
disposing of assets, small business owners find the leasing (renting) 
cancellation option to be attractive. The cancellation option provides small 
businesses with the ability to terminate two commitments—asset ownership 
and financing—that are not normally present in a borrow and purchase 
alternative. It is advantageous for a small business because they often make 
mistakes, and leasing is the least costly way to undo a mistake. It also provides 
limited liability even where it is usually not possible in organizational form, 
such as proprietorship or partnership.’® Furthermore, the possibility of 
mispricing by leasing companies, for example, charging the same rate for 
all types of businesses, may make leases attractive to small firms that 
otherwise would find alternative sources of financing too expensive. Fourth, 
equity may be overestimated due to failure to account for the potential 
liabilities such as estate tax. Thus, the usefulness of the simple debt to equity 
ratio for small firms as a tool for analysis is much reduced. Having these 
effects on the definition of the small businesses leverage ratio in mind, I list 
below the factors that may explain debt to equity ratios among small 
businesses."
Reasons for Higher Leverage
•  value of reputation and informal relationship. Agency costs are reduced 
for lenders and other capital suppliers who are personally familiar with 
the owners. Monitoring as well as information acquisition are lower 
in this case too. For instance, business transaction related debt such 
as accounts payable, prepaid receipts, etc., could cost less than other 
external sources of funds.
•  no or partial limited liability. Interestingly, lack of perfect protection 
from liability makes the lender more willing to provide financing 
because small business owners would have to put up personal assets, 
implicitly or explicitly, as collateral. It serves as a good bonding 
mechanism within limits. The limitations are: (i) when compared to 
assets in the firm as collateral, lenders cannot monitor the use and 
disposal of personal assets. Thus, the value lenders can claim is also 
less certain; (ii) when lender’s loss exceeds claimable personal wealth, 
limited liability is again restored to the borrower/small business.
•  fewer lenders. Small businesses tend to have fewer lenders. The fewer 
the number of lenders, the less is the conflict among lenders in case 
of default. Disagreements among the lenders are often a major source 
of bankruptcy costs, in terms of higher administrative bankruptcy costs 
and dissipation of firm value due to delayed resolution. In the case of 
one lender, the lender would simply take over the firm at no bankruptcy
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expense. The reduction of bankruptcy costs induces more debt from 
the lenders.
•  quasi equity and unreported equity. Quasi equity, or financing 
provided by family and friends, and unreported equity, owners various 
contributions, are expected to give the firm more capacity to acquire 
outside debt.^^
•  risk taking and overoptimistic entrepreneurs. By virtue of self selection, 
entrepreneurs who are willing to start a new business and sacrifice 
stable employment and leisure are more prone to take risks, and 
possibly, more optimistic too. Although there is no assurance that they 
will obtain the funds they want, they will most surely take as much 
as they can get.
2. Reasons for Lower Leverage
•  tax disadvantage. The combined business and personal incomes of many 
small business owners are at the low end of the progressive personal and 
corporate tax schedules. Since they boirow from institutions or wealthier 
individuals in a higher income tax bracket, the tax deduction they receive 
from borrowing will not be adequate to offset the gross up-in-interest 
expense to compensate the lenders’ personal taxes on interest incomes,
i.e., the net tax shield is negative. Thus, in contrast to larger firms, taxes 
actually favor less not more debt for small business.
•  desire to maintain control. As discussed earlier, small businesses that 
want to keep control in the family may forego large scale expansion 
that requires outside financing. Consequently, leverage would be low 
for these firms.
•  minimize agency costs. Since unlimited liability in a partnership is 
potentially costly to the nonmanaging partner when the partnership 
uses debt, a way to neutralize this source of risk is no or low debt.
•  owners’ risk aversion. The combination of lack of diversification on 
their personal portfolio (the possibility of unlimited liability and high 
personal bankruptcy costs) make some owners hesitant to acquire large 
amount of debt. However, if the extent of the entrepreneur’s risk 
aversion is known to the lender, the amount of debt the firm is willing 
to carry could be a credible signal of the entrepreneur’s expectation.
•  high cost of bonding and monitoring. Beyond the sources of financing 
that are personally familiar with the owners, most lenders find 
monitoring a large number of small business a rather expensive 
proposition. Some owners of new small businesses simply do not have 
much to offer as a way of bonding. Thus, higher monitoring and 
bonding costs translates into higher cost of fund and less debt.
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•  minimize estate tax. Estimating the values of small businesses involves 
a wide range of uncertainties. Small business owners and their heirs 
have the incentive to report a lower estimate of their businesses worth 
as the basis for estate tax. In addition to trading off short term for long 
term earnings, a small business may effectively use less debt to bias 
the estimate. The underlying idea is as follows: If the value of the small 
business could take on a wide range, say, from a high value {u) to a 
low value (/), only the owner knows its true value. And if the owner 
of a high value small business acquires debt, du, close to its high value, 
it appears to the court as a high value firm since the amount of debt 
establishes a floor to the value of the firm. In other words, if the firm 
is not worth u, the lender would not have lent du- Thus, the lender 
unwittingly provides the court a free valuation. Therefore, to mislead 
the court, a high value firm would use low or no debt and be priced 
at no worse than the average value, {{u +  /]/2).‘^
Finally, standard factors affecting leverage such as higher bankruptcy 
costs, greater asymmetric information and the corresponding lesser ability 
to signal could all cause small businesses to acquire less debt.
The Dividends Decision
In analyzing small businesses, it is more fruitful to expand the topic 
of dividends decision to one of total cash flows to and from the owners. Thus, 
it includes the owner’s contributions, various forms of compensations 
including company-provided perks, loan to or from the officers, as well as 
remittances from profit earned. An attempt to minimize overall taxes, for 
example, may dictate that the owner uses the business account for personal 
expenses rather than to consume out of dividend, like driving a car registered 
under the company’s name. The owner’s subsequent equity contributions 
may be viewed as negative dividends, which may serve a signaling purpose 
to outside fund suppliers. Better still, owners may also label their 
contributions as loans to the firm.^ '* They can take a deduction at the 
corporate tax rate on interest paid, which is not .possible for dividends. 
Furthermore, there could be an arbitrage gain if the owner’s business tax 
rate exceeds his personal tax rate.
To facilitate comparison with the large publicly traded firms, I list below 
the determinants of dividends for small businesses.
Reasons for More Dividends
•  as a solution to agency problems. In small businesses with many 
owners, managing partners can substitute perks for dividends while
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nonmanaging partners get nothing. Thus, in spite of a possible tax 
penalty on distributed dividends, nonmanaging partners would 
demand dividends. After all, after-tax dividends is better than nothing. 
Therefore, it is not unusual to find a full payout or a specific dividend 
policy written on corporate charter or partnership agreement.
•  tax. Shareholders of a subchapter “S” corporation being taxed as 
individuals, have to pay tax on undistributed profit. A 100% payout 
is indeed expected.*^
•  for consumption by heirs. Lack of a ready market and unwillingness 
to lose their proportional influence in the family business cause heirs 
to prefer dividends. Receiving taxable dividends for consumption may 
not appear to be irrational if (1) dividends distributed from profit 
reduce the power of the dominant family member in the business and
(2) maintaining proportion shares is strategically important in the 
game of control, e.g., obtaining a proportional shares of merger 
premium offered by an outside bidder.
Reasons for Less Dividends
•  tax minimization. As shown in the discussion above, owners of some 
small businesses, e.g., “C” or regular corporations, couldreduce overall 
taxes via other forms of distributions, such as interest payments, and 
substitution of business for personal expenses as tax deductible perks. 
This flexibility is not possible with a large firm with many 
shareholders.
•  to provide internal financing. Asymmetric information, transaction 
costs, and lack of access to the securities market make some small 
businesses with growth prospects rely more on internally generated 
funds. The result is less dividends in the current period.
The Liquidity Decision
The question of interest here is whether small businesses keep more or 
less liquid assets, i.e., slacks.
Reasons Favoring More Slacks
•  to guard against uncertain termination. Small businesses face 
uncertain termination in more states of nature than larger firms. Slacks 
or more liquid assets are often needed to avoid liquidating fixed assets 
in the following contingent events: unscheduled dissolution of 
partnership, payment of estate tax, or buyout of departing partners.
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The situation is made more serious due to small businesses high 
earnings variability and lack of market valuation—the high cost of 
being illiquid.
•  to reduce risk of premature liquidation. When asymmetric information 
is severe, a temporary shortfall of cash from operations, below the level 
required to satisfy debt obligations, may induce the lenders to-initiate 
the bankruptcy proceeding in some cases. Reserve of excess liquidity 
that can be called upon to make up the shortfall would avoid premature 
liquidation. Thus, riskier but ultimately profitable firms are expected 
to hold excess liquidity. Here, liquidity rises with the amount of debt 
and the potential for difference in expectations between the lenders and 
the firms.
•  to strengthen bargaining position. Small businesses could strengthen 
their bargaining position against adverse stakeholders in several ways:
(i) slacks enable the firm to pay off banks, suppliers and other 
creditors and thus avoids closer monitoring or restrictions on 
its ability to make business and financial decisions.
(ii) the presence of slack also allows the firm to flex its muscle, or 
show it has the resources to outlast the other party in the 
negotiation (e.g., labor) or to shop for an alternative source of 
supplies or funds.
Reasons Favoring Less Slacks
•  to use other least costly substitutes. Small business owners could, 
instead of keeping slacks in the business, store slacks in their own 
personal account. Although both excess liquidity at the personal and 
the business accounts could be called upon if needed, the personal 
account has the added advantage that additional contribution of its 
slack is voluntary (or it may be viewed as an option which the owners 
may decide not to exercise).
•  to reduce agency costs. Small slack reduces the potential for agency 
costs in a partnership, i.e., managing partners would have fewer excess 
funds for perks. Unfortunately, assets that are too illiquid increase 
agency costs from the owners to the lenders. Illiquid assets that have 
low liquidation value from second best use lock in’ the lenders, and 
could cause them to accept a partial loss on a bad loan in preference 
to outright liquidation.
Finally, before leaving this section, I would like to discuss the effect of 
not having marketable securities on the financial decisions made by small
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firms. W ithout an objective market valuation, exit by partners or 
shareholders represents a major agency problem that can waste a large 
portion of the firm’s assets in a dispute. A solution, albeit not optimal ex 
post, is for all the owners to pre-commit to a formula in calculating the exit 
price, for instance, five times the last three years average earnings. On the 
positive side, a privately held small firm need not be concerned with short 
term fluctuations in share prices, and sometimes, with financial 
performance. However, even if they may not have to use costly signals to 
resolve the asymmetric information with shareholders, they would still have 
to find other ways to signal to the stakeholders (creditors, customers, 
employees) such as via the amount of owner’s contributions.
IV. A SUMMARY OF PREDICTIONS FOR VARIOUS 
TYPES OF SMALL BUSINESSES
There is no typical small business, consequently, there is no single 
prescription for financial decisions of such businesses. Attempts to explain 
observed behaviors of small businesses depend on the type of small businesses 
and their special set of circumstances. Following, I list several small business 
types and briefly discuss their main financial characteristics.
Entrepreneurs in High Tech Firms
Entrepreneurs in new markets or with new products such as high tech 
firms, are by selection risk takers and self-confident, otherwise they would 
not have given up a secured job with steady income. They are also resource- 
poor relative to the cash demands of the business. Those without a proven 
track record experience the most difficulty in securing financings, i.e., the 
probability of obtaining outside financing is low. Thus, in the short term, 
their overconfidence and overoptimism will cause them to overinvest 
(personal wealth, own time and energy, and business investment), and their 
concern with establishing a track record induces them to choose suboptimal 
projects with short term payoffs. As the values of these firms depend on their 
future growth opportunities, outsiders cannot easily distinguish the values 
of the truly high-growth from those of the mediocre or average firms. 
Furthermore, all entrepreneurs, good or bad, make the ultimate sacrifice, to 
quit their jobs and invest all their own monies as well as their F-connection 
monies, and good firms with limited ability to signal are bound to be 
undervalued, i.e., pay higher interest rate or receive lower price for securities. 
Their lack of financial resources will also bias downward the value of projects 
with multiple options in future periods as there could be future states of the
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world where they would lack the requisite fund to exercise a profitable 
investment opportunity. Excess liquidity is desired but generally less 
available.
Founders in Established Firms
These firms have a good track record. If they are profitable, they would 
have the deep pocket to maximize long run value. They could also use the 
corporate form to minimize overall (corporate and personal) taxes, or 
maximize after-tax personal consumption. They would want to have a 
succession plan and groom a successor as early as possible to transfer the 
business’s goodwill and reputation. Careful planning will also minimize 
estate tax. A less successful firm on the other hand will have a different set 
of problems. For instance, lack of attractive employment opportunities often 
means that small business owners with or without outside debt would delay 
termination or sale of their business beyond the optimal time. If the 
consequences of declaring business failure is large, i.e., the possibility of 
establishing a new business is nil, then, there is an inducement to invest in 
very risky opportunities. In the unlikely event of success, the business not 
only ensures survival, it also establishes a more favorable track record for 
future financing.
Family Controlled Firms
Small businesses whose family members control the majority of voting 
shares may or may not value control. If they value absolute control, they 
may underinvest to avoid outside financing. Excess liquidity, either in the 
form of slack or preferring more liquid assets, may also be observed. On the 
other hand, if relative control is important, family members would prefer 
to receive taxable dividends for consumption rather than dilute their relative 
share via sales to other members, to avoid a change in the balance of power 
in the family.
Partnership
Agency problems could be very serious in a partnership type of 
arrangement. The managing partner may not only consume excessive perks 
but could also take excessive risk at the expense of the silent (non-managing) 
partners’ unlimited liabilities. One would expect the non-managing partner 
to either spend resources to monitor or put restrictions on the activities of 
the managing partner. Contractually specified restrictions include 100% 
dividend payout and zero slack to minimize opportunity for perks, and no
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significant debt to reduce risk of unlimited liability. Thus, depending on 
the protection accorded the non-managing partners, the investment decision 
for a partnership could range from a very risky overinvestment to a very 
conservative underinvestment policy.
Small Businesses in Transition
Small businesses on the verge of approaching outside sources, e.g., 
venture capitalists, lenders, or other investors, may take on entirely different 
behavior. They would need to project as high a market value as possible, 
whether asymmetric information is or is not the reason for difference in 
valuation. They would conduct window dressing, e.g., reporting liquid 
assets, more favorable earnings, etc., or show a preference for short term 
projects with early cash flows.
Franchises
The franchise organizational form solves several financial problems. 
With the owner/franchisee’s own money at stake, agency cost is minimized. 
To the lenders, the franchisee’s use of borrowed funds is well-defined, thus 
reducing the risk of asset substitution. Moreover, part of the monitoring 
function is performed by the franchisor, which the lenders can free ride and 
pass on the savings on credit investigation and loan monitoring costs to the 
franchisee by reducing the cost of financing. Franchising is also a cost 
effective way to transfer the track record or reputation of the franchisor to 
the franchisees.
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This paper represents a first attempt at differentiating the problems of finance 
of the privately held small businesses from their larger counterparts. Small 
businesses, though not concerned with the problems and opportunities 
associated with publicly traded firms, have different types of complexities, 
such as shorter expected life, presence of estate tax, intergenerational transfer 
problems, and prevalence of implicit contracts. Some standard problems like 
agency and asymmetric information are also more complex. The relatively 
high transaction costs faced by small businesses in all types of financial 
decisions also preclude a sizable subset of available choices.
The finance problem for small businesses is indeed very rich. There is 
no single prescription for the optimal financial decision for different types 
of small businesses—startups or new ventures versus established or matures
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ones. Once this fact is recognized, the challenge for the finance researcher 
is to, on the one hand, provide a more detailed theoretical model and 
empirical testing for each type, and, on the other hand, to continuously 
synthesize the results of small businesses in general.
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NOTES
1. Admittedly, there are a few very large privately held firms. Still, they are not well-analyzed 
and since they do share several common features with small privately held firms, some 
of the results on the latter group may also be applicable to them as well.
2. In contrast, corporate level risk taking (business and financial) is separable from personal 
risk taking for large incorporated firms.
3. Charles Ou pointed out to me that only 10-25% of successful business owners '‘consider” 
transferring the business to their heirs. Most simply wanted to sell and thus incur capital 
gains.
4. Estate tax on small businesses differs from capital gain tax of publicly traded firms in 
both magnitude and timing. Estate tax, to be incurred at the demise of the ovmer, is 
often not reflected as a contingent item that reduces the equity account. Capital gain 
tax on the other hand is reflected in the pricing of shares. Even random sales of shares 
to pay for estate tax will not cause the publicly traded firm to liquidate.
5. See Yazdipour and Constand [8] for an extensive list of reference on small finance 
research.
6. Tax on excess accumulation of profit in theory is equally applicable to both large and 
small firms. But in reality, it applies almost exclusively to small firms.
7. I do not discuss here the profitability of small business investments. Except for a few 
truly superior opportunities where small businesses offer unique product or service with 
large potential demand, most investment decisions involve imitation of existing 
businesses where success is a function of the owner’s familiarity of the local conditions 
and efforts.
8. See, for example, Myers [4] and Berovitch and Kim [3].
9. Of course, the unwieldy coordination and communication problems in large firms could 
cause them to forego many positive NPV projects as well.
10. There have been several noteworthy works on small business financing. See, for example, 
Bates [2], Ou [5] Stoll, Whaley and Day [6] and Walker [7].
11. In contrast, the rationale for cancell^le lease to large firms involves the possibility of 
jumps in technological innovations in the same class of equipment.
12. Although the real effect is to increase the supply (dollar amount) of debt, not 
incorporating quasi equity debt to equity ratio would appear to be too high.
13. The low value firm has no choice but to follow suit in this situation of minimizing 
valuation for estate tax.
14. IRS imposes a limit, albeit a rather high one, on the allowable ratio of this type of debt 
to equity.
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15. Nonetheless, an ‘S’ corporation could still use undistributed after-tax profit as a source 
of internal funds, a combination of dividend payout, pay tax on dividends, and reinvest 
proceeds.
16. In an earlier paper (Ang [1]), I pointed out some unique characteristics of small 
businesses in general, and urged the investigation of different approaches to model small 
businesses.
On the Theory of Finance for Privately Held Firms 203
REFERENCES
[1] Ang, J. S., “Small Business Uniqueness and the Theory of Financial Management,” 
Journal of Small Business Finance  ^Volume 1, 1991.
[2] Bates, T., “Financial Capital Structure and Small Business Viability,” in Advances in 
Small Business Finance, Rassoul Yazdipour (ed.), Kluwer Academic Publishers: 
Dordrecht, Netherlands, 1991.
[3] Berkovitch, E. and E. H. Kim, “Financial Contracting and Leverage Induced Over-sp 
and Under-Investment Incentives,” Journal of Financey Volume 45, July 1990, pp. 765- 
794.
[4] Myers, S. C., “Determinants of Corporate Borrow i^ng,” Journal of Financial Economics, 
Volume 5, 1977, pp. 147-175.
[5] Ou, Charles, “The Debt-Equity Relationship for Small Business—An Alternative 
Explanation,” paper presented at the Third Annual Symposium on Small Business 
Finance, April 1991.
[6] Stoll, H., R. Whaley and T. Day, Taxes, Financial Policy and Small Business, Lexington 
Books: Lexington, MA, 1985.
[7] Walker, D. A., “An Empirical Analysis of Financing the Small Firm,” in Advances in 
Small Business Finance, Rassoul Yazdipour (ed.), Kluwer Academic Publishers: 
Dordrecht, Netherlands, 1991.
[8] Yazdipour, R. and R. Constand, “The State of Research in the Field of Small Business 
Finance,” paper presented at the Third Annual Symposium on Small Business Finance, 
April 1991.
